



# **USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal**

CUWW Outreach Journal

5 June 2015

**Feature Item:** *"Is North Korea Gearing Up for Another Space Launch?"* Authored by Jeffrey Lewis; published by 38 North.org; 2 June 2015.

<http://38north.org/2015/06/jlewis060215/>

On May 8, KCNA carried a typically vituperative essay by North Korea's national space authority stating that "No matter who dares grumble and no matter how all hostile forces challenge the launch, satellites of *Juche* Korea will soar into the space one after another at the time and place designated and decided by the supreme leadership of the Korean revolution."

## **U.S. Nuclear Weapons**

1. [Boeing Lands \\$466.5 Million Deal for Ballistic Missile Repairs](#)
2. [Lawmaker: Moscow Can Answer Possible Deployment of US Nuclear Missiles in Europe](#)

## **U.S. Counter-WMD**

1. [Major Flaws Revealed in Alaska-Based US Anti-Missile Defense](#)
2. [THAAD Missile Defense System Could Be Used to Defend against Chinese Attack on US](#)

## **U.S. Arms Control**

1. [Positive Outlook in US-Russian Dialogue on Nuclear Disarmament Unobserved](#)
2. [Share of Modern Missiles in Russian Strategic Missile Forces to Reach 56% by Year End](#)
3. [Moscow May Deploy Nuclear Arms Anywhere in Russia, Including Crimea](#)
4. [US Missiles to Counter Russia in Europe? Options Weighed after Alleged Nuclear Treaty Breach](#)
5. [US Deployment of Missiles in Europe May Lead to Russia's Exit from INF](#)

## **Homeland Security/The Americas**

1. [ISIS Considers Transporting Nuclear Weapon to U.S. through Nigeria; Says Country's Army "Collapsed"](#)
2. [Live Anthrax Sent to 51 Labs in 17 States and 3 Nations – Pentagon](#)

## **Asia/Pacific**

1. [US Failed at Planting Stuxnet-Style Computer Bug in N. Korea Nuke Program](#)
2. [China Voices Concern over Possible THAAD Deployment in S. Korea](#)
3. [N. Korea Warns of 'Tragedy' from Failed U.S. Policy](#)
4. [Senate Defense Bill Defines N. Korea as 'Nuclear-Armed Country'](#)
5. [North Korean Media Say US Seeks to Unleash Biological Warfare against North Korea](#)
6. [S. Korea Test-Fires Medium-Range Ballistic Missile](#)

Issue No.1168, 05 June 2015

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### **Europe/Russia**

1. [Russian Aerospace Defense Forces to Hold 200 Summer Exercises](#)

### **Middle East**

2. [Iran's Zarif: Differences Remain, Tight Schedule Ahead](#)
3. [ISIL Attacks Anbar Province's Residential Areas with Chlorine Payloads](#)
4. [Obama: No Military Solution to Iran's Nuclear Program](#)
5. [Construction to begin at Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant in Fall: Rosatom](#)
6. [Russian Arms Maker Ready to Supply S-300 Missiles to Iran](#)
7. [U.S.: Report of Growing Iran Nuclear Fuel Stockpile Not 'Major Obstacle' to Deal](#)
8. [Iran Military Prowess Advances Amid Nuclear Talks, Pentagon Says](#)
9. [Experts: Iran Negotiators Ignore Missiles at Their Own Peril](#)
10. [No Access beyond NPT: Araghchi](#)
11. [Russia Says 'No Crisis or Setback' in Iran Nuclear Talks; Experts Continue Work](#)
12. [Deputy Iran, US FM's Pursue Completing Agreement Text](#)
13. [Commander: Iran Not to Allow Even 'Restricted Access' to Military Sites](#)

### **India/Pakistan**

1. [Isis Could Obtain Nuclear Weapon from Pakistan, Warns India](#)
2. [India, US to Sign Military Cooperation Agreement, Talk on Missile Defence, WMD Proliferation](#)
3. [Pakistan Says It Will Not Sign Non-Proliferation Treaty](#)
4. [US Confident of Pakistan's Ability to Safeguard Nuclear Weapons](#)
5. [Pakistan Rules Out Sharing Nukes with Saudis, Anyone Else](#)

### **Commentary**

1. [Why North Korea Wants Mutually Assured Destruction](#)
2. [Nuclear Weapons: The 'All of the Above' Strategy](#)
3. [China's Defence White Paper Sees Threats in Local Wars, Not Major Powers](#)
4. [Next Up: Nuclear Talks with North Korea?](#)

Washington Business Journal – Washington, D.C.

### **Boeing Lands \$466.5 Million Deal for Ballistic Missile Repairs**

By Jill R. Aitoro, Senior Staff Reporter, *Washington Business Journal*

June 4, 2015

The Boeing Co. landed a \$466.5 million deal to ensure one-third of the nuclear triad remains functioning.

The Air Force contract announced Wednesday calls for repair of the missile guidance of the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile. Work will be expected to be complete by June 2, 2021.

The Minuteman is one component of the nuclear triad, the other two parts being the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile and nuclear weapons carried by long-range strategic bombers.

And these repairs come as another leg of the triad remains in a state of uncertainty. That is, the Navy continues to figure out its approach forward with the Ohio-class sub program, which General Dynamics Corp. hopes to replace.



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Even with repairs to the Minutemen and other ongoing efforts to keep nuclear capabilities viable, any further delay on that roughly \$80 billion program to replace aging nuclear submarines will "risk the most survivable leg of the nation's nuclear triad," said Arthur Hopkins, the Pentagon's nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs chief in April Senate testimony.

[http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/blog/fedbiz\\_daily/2015/06/boeing-lands-466-5-million-deal-for-ballistic.html](http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/blog/fedbiz_daily/2015/06/boeing-lands-466-5-million-deal-for-ballistic.html)

[Return to Top](#)

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia

### **Lawmaker: Moscow Can Answer Possible Deployment of US Nuclear Missiles in Europe**

*Colonel General Viktor Zavarzin said "the US administration needs to weigh everything carefully before making such ill-considered steps"*

June 05, 2015

MOSCOW, June 5. /TASS/. Member of the State Duma Defense committee Colonel General Viktor Zavarzin has said that Russia has counter-arguments to the possible deployment of US nuclear missiles in Europe.

"If the Americans indeed deploy their ground-based nuclear missiles in Europe, in this case we will face the necessity of retaliating. And we have such an opportunity," Zavarzin told TASS on Friday.

He confirmed that the current state and technical equipment of the Russian Armed Forces made it possible to respond immediately to all challenges and threats emanating from outside the country's borders. "In this case, the US administration needs to weigh everything carefully before making such ill-considered steps," he said.

The Associated Press reported on Thursday that the Obama administration was considering the deployment of land-based missiles in Europe "that could pre-emptively destroy the Russian weapons". The AP cites an unclassified portion of a report written by the office of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey "that examines weapons the US could develop and deploy if freed from INF treaty constraints."

<http://tass.ru/en/russia/799098>

[Return to Top](#)

Alaska Dispatch – Anchorage, AK

### **Major Flaws Revealed in Alaska-Based US Anti-Missile Defense**

By David Willman, *Los Angeles Times*

May 30, 2015

WASHINGTON -- Two serious technical flaws have been identified in the ground-launched anti-missile interceptors that the United States would rely on to defend against a nuclear attack by North Korea, including those based in Alaska.

Pentagon officials were informed of the problems as recently as last summer but decided to postpone corrective action. They told federal auditors that acting immediately to fix the defects would interfere with the production of new interceptors and slow a planned expansion of the nation's homeland missile defense system, according to a new report by the Government Accountability Office.

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As a result, all 33 interceptors deployed at Vandenberg Air Force Base in Santa Barbara County, Calif., and Fort Greely, Alaska, have one of the defects. Ten of those interceptors -- plus eight being prepared for delivery this year -- have both.

Summing up the effect on missile-defense readiness, the GAO report said that "the fielded interceptors are susceptible to experiencing ... failure modes," resulting in "an interceptor fleet that may not work as intended."

The flaws could disrupt sensitive on-board systems that are supposed to steer the interceptors into enemy missiles in space.

The GAO report, an annual assessment of missile defense programs prepared for congressional committees, describes the problems in terse, technical terms. Defense specialists interviewed by the Los Angeles Times/Tribune Washington Bureau provided more detail.

#### Alaska-based interceptors

The interceptors form the heart of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, GMD for short. Four of the massive, three-stage rockets are stationed at Vandenberg and 29 at Fort Greely.

They would rise out of underground silos in response to an attack. Atop each interceptor is a 5-foot-long "kill vehicle," designed to separate from its boost rocket in space, fly independently at a speed of 4 miles per second and crash into an enemy warhead \_ a feat that has been likened to hitting one bullet with another.

The GMD system was deployed in 2004 as part of the nation's response to Sept. 11, 2001, and a heightened fear of attack by terrorist groups or rogue states. It has cost taxpayers more than \$40 billion so far and has been plagued by technical deficiencies.

One of the newly disclosed shortcomings centers on wiring harnesses embedded within the kill vehicles' dense labyrinth of electronics.

A supplier used an unsuitable soldering material to assemble harnesses in at least 10 interceptors deployed in 2009 and 2010 and still part of the fleet.

The same material was used in the eight interceptors that will be placed in silos this year, according to GAO analyst Cristina Chaplain, lead author of the report.

The soldering material is vulnerable to corrosion in the interceptors' underground silos, some of which have had damp conditions and mold. Corrosion "could have far-reaching effects" because the "defective wiring harnesses" supply power and data to the kill vehicle's on-board guidance system, said the GAO report, which is dated May 6.

When Boeing Co., prime contractor for the GMD system, informed government officials of the problem last summer, they did not insist upon repair or replacement of the defective harnesses, according to the report.

Instead, Missile Defense Agency officials "assessed the likelihood for the component's degradation in the operational environment as low and decided to accept the component as is," the report said.

The decision minimized delays in producing new interceptors, "but increased the risk for future reliability failures," the report said.

Chaplain told the Times that based on her staff's discussions with the Missile Defense Agency, officials there have "no timeline" for repairing the wiring harnesses.

#### 'Performance issues'

The agency encountered a similar problem with wiring harnesses years earlier, and the supplier was instructed not to use the deficient soldering material. But "the corrective actions were not passed along to other suppliers," according to the GAO report.

L. David Montague, co-chairman of a National Academy of Sciences panel that reviewed operations of the Missile Defense Agency, said officials should promptly set a schedule for fixing the harnesses.

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"The older they are with that kind of a flawed soldering, the more likely they are to fail," Montague, a former president of missile systems for Lockheed Corp., said in an interview.

The second newly disclosed defect involves a component called a divert thruster, a small motor intended to help maneuver the kill vehicles in flight. Each kill vehicle has four of them.

The GAO report refers to "performance issues" with the thrusters. It offers few details, and GAO auditors declined to elaborate, citing a fear of revealing classified information. They did say that the problem is different from an earlier concern that the thruster's heavy vibrations could throw off the kill vehicle's guidance system.

The report and interviews with defense specialists make clear that problems with the divert thruster have bedeviled the interceptor fleet for years. To address deficiencies in the original version, Pentagon contractors created a redesigned "alternate divert thruster."

The government planned to install the new version in many of the currently deployed interceptors over the next few years and to retrofit newly manufactured interceptors, according to the GAO report and interviews with its authors.

That plan was scrapped after the alternate thruster, in November 2013, failed a crucial ground test to determine whether it could withstand the stresses of flight, the report said. To stay on track for expanding the fleet, senior Pentagon officials decided to keep building interceptors with the original, deficient thruster.

The GAO report faulted the Missile Defense Agency, an arm of the Pentagon, for "omitting steps in the design process" of the alternate thruster in the rush to deploy more interceptors. The skipped steps would have involved a lengthier, more rigorous vetting of the new design, defense specialists said. The report said the omission contributed to the 2013 test failure.

All 33 interceptors now deployed have the original, defective thruster. The eight interceptors to be added to the fleet this year will contain the same component, GAO officials told the Times.

The missile agency currently "does not plan to fix" those thrusters, despite their "known performance issues," said the GAO report.

Contractors are continuing to work on the alternate thruster, hoping to correct whatever caused the ground-test failure. The first test flight using the alternate thruster is scheduled for late this year.

The GAO had recommended that the Pentagon postpone integrating the eight new interceptors into the fleet until after that test. Defense Department officials rebuffed the recommendation, the report said.

Problems traced to pace of project

In a response included in the report, Assistant Secretary of Defense Katharina G. McFarland wrote that delaying deployment of the new interceptors "would unacceptably increase the risk" that the Pentagon would fall short of its goal of expanding the GMD system from 33 interceptors to 44 by the end of 2017.

Asked for comment on the report, a spokesman for the Missile Defense Agency, Richard Lehner, said in a statement that officials "have in place a comprehensive, disciplined program to improve and enhance" the GMD system "regarding the issues noted by the GAO."

"We will continue to work closely with our industry partners to ensure quality standards are not only met, but exceeded," the statement said.

Boeing declined to comment.

The GMD system is designed to repel a "limited" missile attack by a non-superpower adversary, such as North Korea. The nation's defense against a massive nuclear assault by Russia or China still relies on "mutually assured destruction," the Cold War notion that neither country would strike first for fear of a devastating counterattack.

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GMD's roots go back to the Clinton administration, when concern began to mount over the international spread of missile technology and nuclear development programs. In 2002, President George W. Bush ordered "an initial set of missile defense capabilities" to be put in place within two years to protect the U.S.

To accelerate deployment, then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld exempted the missile agency from the Pentagon's standard procurement rules and testing standards.

Engineers trace the system's difficulties to the breakneck pace at which components were produced and fielded. In precisely scripted flight tests above the Pacific, interceptors have failed to hit mock-enemy warheads about half the time.

As a result, the missile agency projects that four or five interceptors would have to be fired at any single enemy warhead, according to current and former government officials. Under this scenario, a volley of 10 enemy missiles could exhaust the entire U.S. inventory of interceptors.

The Obama administration, after resisting calls for a larger system, pledged two years ago to increase the number of interceptors to 44. Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress have pushed for further expansion. The House this month passed a bill authorizing \$30 million to plan and design a site for interceptors on the East Coast. The White House called the move "premature."

<http://www.adn.com/article/20150530/major-flaws-revealed-alaska-based-us-anti-missile-defense>

[Return to Top](#)

The Hankyoreh – Seoul, South Korea

### **THAAD Missile Defense System Could Be Used to Defend against Chinese Attack on US**

By Park Hyun, Washington correspondent and Park Byong-su, senior staff writer in Singapore

June 2, 2015

Seoul and Washington have until now been saying that deployment of THAAD would only be to defend against N. Korean missile threat

If the US deploys the radar for THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defense) on the Korean Peninsula, it would be able to detect and track intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) being launched from China toward the continental US at ranges of up to 3,000 km or more as they pass over or north of South Korea, two prominent US experts say.

Data collected in this manner could be communicated in real time to the early warning radar network at Clear Air Force Station in Alaska, which would allow the US to launch intercept missiles earlier.

This means that THAAD is not only intended to defend against missiles from North Korea as the Pentagon and the South Korean Ministry of National Defense claim, but that it would also be actively integrated, and used for interception, in a US missile defense system that is designed to counter China.

With THAAD - which China regards as a serious threat to its security - becoming a new cause of conflict between the US and China, South Korea is expected to be squeezed between the two countries, leading to serious difficulties in the areas of foreign policy, security, and the economy.

These were the results of a joint study conducted by Theodore Postol, professor of science, technology, and security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and George Lewis, senior research associate at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University. The Hankyoreh became the first media outlet to receive the research findings on May 31.

Postol and Lewis, who have been studying missile defense systems for years, are regarded as the preeminent experts in the area. While there has been a great deal of controversy about the capabilities of THAAD radar, this is

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the first time that experts have published a technical analysis of the specific consequences of deploying THAAD on the Korean Peninsula. The analysis is likely to carry major implications for ongoing debate about THAAD.

The two scholars argue that it is a problem that a THAAD base includes the AN/TPY-2 radar, which includes cutting-edge American military technology that enables long-distance detection. This means that, if this radar were deployed on the Korean Peninsula, it would become a component of the missile defense system intended to defend the continental US.

In their analysis, the two scholars conclude that, if this radar were deployed in South Korea, it would have enough time to detect the upper booster stage of a Chinese ballistic missile heading for the West Coast or East Coast of the US from the side or rear, which are easier to detect. Their analysis suggests that this missile could be detected while passing above the Korean Peninsula at a distance of 3,000 or 4,000km.

While this radar would probably not be able to track the warhead of a Chinese ballistic missile, it could detect the movement when the upper booster separates from the warhead. This data could be used by the early warning radar at Clear Air Force Station in Alaska to acquire and track the warhead from a greater distance than is currently possible.

"Data about a Chinese ballistic missile heading for the West Coast of the US would be particularly useful for the US. This could enable ballistic missile interceptors in Alaska to be launched more quickly," Postol said.

Some have argued that if the US deploys "terminal mode" radar (with a detection distance of 600-900 km) rather than "forward-based mode" radar (1,800-2,000km), it would not affect China, but Postol dismisses this as "nonsense" inspired by ignorance of the radar's capability.

He said, "The radar is not constrained to function only in the TM mode. The transition between TM mode and Forward-Based Mode is not difficult."

Analysts in the US defense industry regard the radar's maximum detection range as being greater than 4,500 kilometers, but the actual detection range varies considerably depending on the strength of the reflected signal of the radar waves that bounce back from the target.

The two scholars said that the missile defense system is fundamentally constrained by its inability to distinguish between real and fake warheads, making it inappropriate for meaningful missile defense.

"The radar is likely to be seen by Chinese military planners as potentially significant threats to China's survival should a situation evolve where a nuclear attack against the U.S. is actually being considered," Postol said.

He advised, "The South Korean government and its people need to be fully aware that the Chinese might develop plans to attack this radar as part of an attack on the U.S."

During a meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo at the Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) in Singapore on May 31, Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the general staff department for the Chinese military, expressed his concern about the deployment of THAAD with US military forces in South Korea.

[http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\\_edition/e\\_international/693913.html](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/693913.html)

[Return to Top](#)





Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency

**Positive Outlook in US-Russian Dialogue on Nuclear Disarmament Unobserved**

*Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms control at the Russian Foreign Ministry said that no positive outlook has been observed in dialogue between Russia and the United States on nuclear arms cuts.*

1 June 2015

MOSCOW (Sputnik) – No positive outlook has been observed in dialogue between Russia and the United States on nuclear arms cuts, Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms control at the Russian Foreign Ministry Mikhail Ulyanov said Monday.

“Our dialogue on this on both bilateral Russian-US channels as well as on the Russian-NATO Council have been curtailed, so there are no positive outlooks being observed,” Ulyanov said in an interview with RIA Novosti.

US missile defense systems remain the main challenge in Russian-US relations, Ministry Mikhail Ulyanov said Monday.

“Of all the factors that negatively reflect on strategic stability, the most essential at this time is probably the creation of the global anti-missile defense system,” Ulyanov said in an interview with RIA Novosti.

In April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the United States had breached the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by placing its tactical nuclear weapons in the territories of five European countries.

The exact number of US nuclear weapons deployed in Belgium, Italy, Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands is unknown, but the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation research group puts it at around 500 warheads.

Ulyanov said that the deployment of weapons in space is clearly not an issue for tomorrow, but the situation is gradually headed that way, but the US “missile defense system is already developing in clear compliance with the plans.”

“We have expressed our position on this several times. We need a reliable guarantee of what is being said verbally at every corner that these systems are not pointed at Russian nuclear forces. But so far they’re telling us that such guarantees cannot be fixed on paper and that with or without Russia the systems will be created,” Ulyanov said.

<http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150601/1022794305.html#ixzz3b0ktESDB>

[Return to Top](#)

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia

**Share of Modern Missiles in Russian Strategic Missile Forces to Reach 56% by Year End**

*During the 2015 summer training period, more than 30 tactical exercises with missile regiments and more than 20 special tactical exercises will be conducted, RVSN spokesman said*

June 01, 2015

MOSCOW, June 1. /TASS/. The share of modern missile systems in the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) will reach 56% by the end of the year, RVSN spokesman Igor Yegorov told reporters on Monday.

"During the 2015 summer training period, more than 30 tactical exercises with missile regiments and more than 20 special tactical exercises with support and security units will be conducted, including more than 30% snap drills. By the end of this year, the share of modern missile systems will reach 56%," Yegorov said.

According to him, the Strategic Missile Forces will have a total of more than 100 command-staff, tactical and special exercises in 2015. The exercises will be conducted in a complex and tense situation, including with the involvement of inter-service interactive forces and means.





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Yegorov said the strategic missile troops will pay the most attention to the Safe Environment drill. "The Strategic Missile Forces' manoeuvres with NBC protection play a special role. The NBC protection units will drill during the manoeuvres detection of more than 10 varieties of pathogens causing bacterial and viral diseases, including such as anthrax, plague and Ebola," the Strategic Missile Forces representative said.

<http://tass.ru/en/russia/797864>

[Return to Top](#)

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency

### **Moscow May Deploy Nuclear Arms Anywhere in Russia, Including Crimea**

*The Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms control at the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Russia retains its right to deploy nuclear weapons anywhere on its territory if necessary.*

1 June 2015

MOSCOW (Sputnik) – Russia retains its right to deploy if necessary nuclear weapons anywhere on its territory, including on the Crimean Peninsula, Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms control at the Russian Foreign Ministry Mikhail Ulyanov said Monday.

"Russia obviously retains the right if needed to deploy its nuclear weapons anywhere on its national territory, including on the Crimean Peninsula," Ulyanov said in an interview with RIA Novosti in regard to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin's statement during a NATO ministerial meeting in mid-May in Antalya, Turkey.

Earlier the Russian Defense Ministry announced plans that during snap combat readiness exercises it would redeploy 10 Tu-22M3 (Flanker) long-range aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons; however, there was no mention of arming them with nuclear warheads. The United States expressed its concern of the possible deployment of nuclear arms in Crimea.

According to Klimkin, "the deployment of nuclear weapons in Crimea would be the most serious breach in Russia's international commitments" in numerous agreements, including the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"Any activity or even signals from Russia on the mere possibility of deploying nuclear weapons in Crimea will be considered the gravest breach in all international norms. In this case, the international community will need to react most decisively," Klimkin said.

Russia's Ulyanov said the same statement was made by Klimkin during another conference on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Arms.

"How is it that [Klimkin], in seeing Crimea as part of Ukrainian territory, even suggest that the deployment of Russian nuclear arms there would damage the non-nuclear status of Ukraine? The idea is quite interesting in that it can be understood as an indirect attack on the United States, as well as on Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, where US nuclear weapons are already deployed. Following the Ukrainian minister's logic, this is a direct breach of non-nuclear status of these European nations. I won't argue, but I will say that the situation in Crimea is of course different," Ulyanov said.

The Crimean Peninsula was reunited with Russia after a referendum on March 16, 2014.

<http://sputniknews.com/russia/20150601/1022794128.html>

[Return to Top](#)

Issue No.1168, 05 June 2015

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Minneapolis Times Tribune – Minneapolis, MN

## **US Missiles to Counter Russia in Europe? Options Weighed after Alleged Nuclear Treaty Breach**

By ROBERT BURNS, Associated Press

June 4, 2015

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is weighing a range of aggressive responses to Russia's alleged violation of a Cold War-era nuclear treaty, including deploying land-based missiles in Europe that could preemptively destroy the Russian weapons.

This "counterforce" option is among possibilities the administration is considering as it reviews its entire policy toward Russia in light of Moscow's military intervention in Ukraine, its annexation of Crimea and other actions the U.S. deems confrontational in Europe and beyond.

The options go so far as one implied — but not stated explicitly — that would improve the ability of U.S. nuclear weapons to destroy military targets on Russian territory.

It all has a certain Cold War ring, even if the White House ultimately decides to continue tolerating Russia's alleged flight-testing of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range prohibited by the treaty.

Russia denies violating the treaty and has, in turn, claimed violations by the United States in erecting missile defenses.

It is unclear whether Russia has actually deployed the suspect missile or whether Washington would make any military move if the Russians stopped short of deployment. For now, administration officials say they prefer to continue trying to talk Moscow into treaty compliance.

In public, administration officials have used obscure terms like "counterforce" and "countervailing strike capabilities" to describe two of its military response options, apparently hoping to buy time for diplomacy.

The Pentagon declined to make a senior defense policy official available to discuss the issue. A spokesman, Lt. Col. Joe Sowers, said, "All the options under consideration are designed to ensure that Russia gains no significant military advantage from their violation."


At his Senate confirmation hearing in February, Defense Secretary Ash Carter noted his concern about Russia's alleged violation of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, or INF, treaty. He said disregard for treaty limitations was a "two-way street" opening the way for the U.S. to respond in kind.

The standoff speaks volumes about the depths to which U.S.-Russia relations have fallen. And that poses problems not only for the Obama administration but also for the NATO alliance, whose members in eastern Europe are especially leery of allowing Russian provocations to go unanswered.

Western leaders are meeting Sunday and Monday for a G-7 summit — from which Russian President Vladimir Putin has been excluded — where Russian aggression will be a key topic. On Friday, Carter plans to meet in Germany with American defense and diplomatic officials to map out a counterstrategy to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine and to reassure allies worried about Moscow. The treaty issue is not a specific agenda item for Carter, but aides said regional nuclear force issues could come up.

The U.S. and its Western partners have tried to use economic and diplomatic leverage against Putin on a range of conflicts, including Ukraine. But they also recognize that Moscow still plays an important role in international affairs, including the nuclear talks with Iran that are among President Barack Obama's highest foreign policy priorities.

The administration is considering three options for responding militarily to Russian missile treaty violations: defenses to stop a treaty-violating missile, the "counterforce" option to attack a missile preemptively and the "countervailing strike capabilities" option that implies the potential use of nuclear forces.



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One of Carter's nuclear policy aides, Robert Scher, testified in April that "counterforce" means "we could go about and actually attack that missile where it is in Russia." Another Pentagon official, Brian McKeon, testified in December that this option involved potential deployment in Europe of ground-launched cruise missiles.

Scher said another option would involve "not simply attacking" the Russian missile but seeing "what things we can hold at risk within Russia itself." Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert at the Federation of American Scientists, said this could mean further improving the ability of U.S. nuclear or conventional forces to destroy Russian military targets in addition to missiles deemed to violate the INF treaty.

Kristensen said the public discussion of these options amounts to "one hell of a gamble" that Putin will back down on INF.

The Obama administration has been relatively gentle in poking Moscow publicly on the INF issue. The State Department's top arms control official, Rose Gottemoeller, has called the alleged Russian violations a "very grave concern." In December she argued against declaring the treaty dead, saying America's allies also are opposed to that approach.

The State Department said last July that Russia had tested a missile in violation of the treaty, which bans indefinitely the possession, production and flight-testing of missiles — both nuclear and conventional — with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (310 and 3,410 miles)..

The administration has not said whether it believes the Russian missile is nuclear or conventional. But Carter said, in responses for his confirmation hearing, "Russia's INF treaty violation is consistent with its strategy of relying on nuclear weapons to offset U.S. and NATO conventional superiority."

Much about the subject is classified, including a Pentagon assessment of the threat posed by Russian violations.

The Associated Press was given an unclassified portion of a report written by the office of Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that examines weapons the U.S. could develop and deploy if freed from INF treaty constraints.

It identified four such weapons that "could assist in closing ... a capability gap."

Among the four are ground-launched cruise missiles deployed in Europe or Asia, and ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles equipped with technology that adjusts the trajectory of a warhead after it re-enters Earth's atmosphere and heads for its target.

The prospect of returning U.S. medium-range missiles to Europe recalls some of the darker days of the Cold War when Washington's NATO allies hosted U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing 2 ballistic missiles, countering Soviet SS-20 missiles. The U.S.-NATO response prompted a Europe-wide protest movement, followed by U.S.-Soviet negotiations leading to the INF treaty, the first to ban an entire class of missile.

<http://www.startribune.com/us-might-deploy-missiles-in-europe-to-counter-russia/306172021/>

[Return to Top](#)



Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency

### **US Deployment of Missiles in Europe May Lead to Russia's Exit from INF**

*Russia is fully complying with commitments made under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and does not want to withdraw from it, Viktor Ozerov, the Chairman of the Federation Council on Defense and Security, told RIA Novosti.*

5 June 5, 2015

However, if the United States decides to put its missiles in Eastern Europe, Russia will seriously consider pulling out of the agreement, Ozerov said.

Earlier, AP reported that the Obama Administration plans to deploy land-based missiles in Eastern Europe that "could pre-emptively destroy the Russian weapons" in response to Moscow's alleged violation of the INF treaty.

If Washington deploys its missiles in Eastern Europe, its objective wouldn't be to target sites in the Middle East, but to fire at Russia from a close distance, Ozerov said, adding that in this case Russia will have to respond with force.

"Russia has enough strength and means for an adequate response — starting from the withdrawal from the INF treaty and deploying "Iskanders" (short-range ballistic missile system, also known by its NATO reporting name SS-26 Stone) along our Western borders," Ozerov told RIA Novosti.

The Chairman of the Defense Committee stressed that Russia is fully complying with the INF treaty, and although Washington says Moscow violated the agreement in the past, it was not able to provide factual evidence of that.

*As long as the United States sticks to its commitments under the treaty, Russia is willing to respect the agreement as well, Ozerov said, adding that it's pointless to blackmail Russia by threatening to deploy missiles in Eastern Europe. Instead, it is a much better idea to try to find a partnership-based agreement with Russia.*

The INF treaty was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987. The agreement eliminates all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate range, between 500 and 5,000 km (300 — 3,400 miles).

In recent years, both the United States and Russia accused each other of violating terms of the treaty. In 2012, Washington accused Moscow of violating the agreement by allegedly launching a cruise missile from an "Iskander" missile system. However, the US government was not able to provide any factual evidence of their claim. Russia, on the other hand, said US drones were also a violation of the treaty.

<http://sputniknews.com/military/20150605/1022985123.html>

[Return to Top](#)

Premium Times – Abuja, Nigeria

### **ISIS Considers Transporting Nuclear Weapon to U.S. through Nigeria; Says Country's Army "Collapsed"**

By Ibanga Isine

June 3, 2015

ISIS, the jihadist group in Syria, Iraq and Libya, has claimed it could purchase a nuclear device and transport same to the United States, through a network of countries including Nigeria, up to Mexico.

In its latest propaganda magazine, Dabiq, published two weeks ago, the group said the plan is workable the same way banned drugs are transported through West Africa to Western countries, saying it could even be easier with the presence of Boko Haram, the Nigeria-based group that recently pledged allegiance to ISIS.

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ISIS also described the Nigerian Army as “an exhausted and smashed national army that is now in a virtual state of collapse”.

Currently, it said Boko Haram insurgents have taken control of much of Nigeria and their attacks are intensifying and pushing back the military.

That claim contradicts recent successes recorded by the Nigerian military which has recovered several towns seized by the militant group in the last.

In an op-ed piece titled, “The Perfect Storm,” attributed to a kidnapped British photojournalist, John Cantlie, it said the terrorist organisation which started as a movement in Iraq has suddenly turned into a global phenomenon that the West and the democratic world as a whole is ill-equipped to deal with.

Mr. Cantlie has appeared in many propaganda videos released by ISIS after he was kidnapped by the extremist group.

“Nothing on this scale has happened this big or this quick before. Huge swathes of Pakistan, Nigeria, Libya, Yemen, and the Sinai Peninsula are all now united under the black flag of tawhīd, gelled together as one by the Islamic State,” the piece said.

“They (Boko Haram) declared allegiance to the Caliphate in March, and they are the same group, remember, that Obama claimed just last year was being successfully pushed back by American intervention policy.

“Indeed, he claimed that the same model (cutting finances, recruitment tools, and the will to fight) that worked so ‘well’ in the degradation of the mujāhidīn there before their pledge of allegiance, would work just as well on the Islamic State. Some things just don’t work out as planned.”

The article said the idea of reaching the U.S. with a deadly nuclear device is not as far-fetched.

“Let me throw a hypothetical operation onto the table,” Cantlie wrote. “The Islamic State has billions of dollars in the bank, so they call on their wilāyah in Pakistan to purchase a nuclear device through weapons dealers with links to corrupt officials in the region.

“The weapon is then transported overland until it makes it to Libya, where the mujāhidīn move it south to Nigeria. Drug shipments from Columbia bound for Europe pass through West Africa, so moving other types of contraband from East to West is just as possible.

“The nuke and accompanying mujāhidīn arrive on the shorelines of South America and are transported through the porous borders of Central America before arriving in Mexico and up to the border with the United States.

“From there it’s just a quick hop through a smuggling tunnel and hey presto, they’re mingling with another 12 million ‘illegal’ aliens in America with a nuclear bomb in the trunk of their car.”

The Nigerian military did not comment on the article. Defence spokesperson, Chris Olukolade, did not respond to calls and text messages on Tuesday.

<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/184265-isis-considers-transporting-nuclear-weapon-to-u-s-through-nigeria-says-countrys-army-collapsed.html>

[Return to Top](#)



RT (Russia Today) – Moscow, Russia

### **Live Anthrax Sent to 51 Labs in 17 States and 3 Nations – Pentagon**

June 03, 2015

The Department of Defense admitted that 51 labs in 17 states and three different countries received suspected live samples of anthrax over the course of a one-year period, and added that the number of recipients may rise as the investigation continues.

On May 22, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) notified the Pentagon that one of the private lab partners had detected the growth on live anthrax on a sample that was *“supposedly inactivated... we felt that it was [an] inactivate and safe shipment,”* Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work said at a briefing on Wednesday.

*“But it turned out not to be the case,”* he added.

The Department of Defense said that the probe has not found any indication that the samples were sent as a result of a deliberate action or that anyone had been infected by the lethal bacteria. The agency also said there was no danger to the public from the anthrax.

The Pentagon previously said that the anthrax had *“accidentally”* been sent to 24 laboratories in 11 states and two foreign countries. The agency later disclosed that the three countries that received the live spores were Australia, South Korea and Canada. In the US, a lab in the District of Columbia also received a shipment of the anthrax, on top of those in the 17 states.

*“The department has regularly shipped inactivate – or ‘killed’ – biological material to other federal and private partner labs for development of biological countermeasures,”* Work said.

*“So, for example, if we wanted to have a field detector kit that would tell us that anthrax was in the area, what we do is we work with labs and we work with partners who we then provide these killed spores with so that they would then be able to develop a detector that would help our men and women if they encounter such an organism on the battlefield,”* he added.

As a precaution, the DoD has asked labs to stop working on those samples until further notice from the Pentagon and the CDC. The government is also in the midst of testing every previously inactivated anthrax sample – 400 lots worth – to ensure that it does not contain any live spores.

Navy Cdr. Franca Jones, director of medical programs for chemical and biological defense, said it takes 10 days in each case to define if anthrax samples received by labs are live or dead ones.

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall is leading the review into all DoD laboratory procedures and protocols for killing live anthrax spores. Kendall will submit his preliminary findings to Work and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter within 30 days.

Kendall is charged with discovering the root cause of the incomplete deactivation of the samples, why the live spores were not caught during sterility testing, and identifying any systemic problems that caused the inadvertent shipments to occur. His review is separate from the CDC’s probe into DoD labs, Work said.

*“I’m assembling a team of experts from the government and private sector to examine the inactivation processes. They will report preliminary findings and recommendations by the end of June,”* Kendall said. *“The final report depends upon the completion of the CDC’s investigation.”*

The Pentagon promised to update the number of labs that received the live samples on a daily basis, as the investigation continues.

<http://rt.com/usa/264717-pentagon-live-anthrax-sent/>

[Return to Top](#)



## ***USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal***

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency

### **US Failed at Planting Stuxnet-Style Computer Bug in N. Korea Nuke Program**

*The United States unleashed a version of the Stuxnet computer virus five years ago in an unsuccessful attack on North Korea's nuclear weapons program, people familiar with the covert campaign said.*

30 May 2015

The operation began at the same time as a successful US-Israeli joint effort in which the Stuxnet virus was deployed to destroy a thousand or more Iranian centrifuges that were enriching uranium, Reuters reported.

For the attack against North Korea's nuclear program, Stuxnet's developers produced a related virus that would be activated when it encountered Korean-language settings on an infected machine, one US intelligence source told Reuters.

US agents, however, were unable to access the core machines that ran Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, said another source, a former high-ranking intelligence official who was briefed on the program.

As one of the most insular countries in the world, North Korea's utter secrecy, as well as the extreme isolation of its communications systems, foiled the National Security Agency-led campaign, the official told Reuters.

North Korea's communications networks are similarly isolated. One needs police permission just to own a computer, and the open Internet is unknown except to a tiny elite. Furthermore, the country has one main conduit for Internet connections to the outside world, through China, Reuters reported.

Iran, on the other hand, engages in widespread Internet use and had interactions with companies from around the globe.

Experts who spoke with Reuters said there are similarities between North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs, and the two countries continue to collaborate on military technology. Because of that overlap, the NSA would not have had to modify Stuxnet much to make it capable of destroying centrifuges in North Korea.

Despite the subtle differences between the programs, the NSA attack was thwarted by the inability to infiltrate North Korea's program in the first place.

David Albright, founder of the Institute for Science and International Security and an authority on North Korea's nuclear program, told Reuters that US hackers probably tried to get to North Korea by compromising technology suppliers from Iran, Pakistan or China.

As for the successful attack on Iran, a leading theory is that Stuxnet was placed by a sophisticated espionage program developed by a team close to the virus' authors, known as the Equation Group.

<http://sputniknews.com/us/20150530/1022733556.html>

[Return to Top](#)

Yonhap News Agency – Seoul, South Korea

### **China Voices Concern over Possible THAAD Deployment in S. Korea**

By Oh Seok-min

May 31, 2015

SINGAPORE, May 31 (Yonhap) -- China expressed concern Sunday over the possible deployment of an advanced U.S. air defense system on the Korean Peninsula, a South Korean official said.

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Adm. Sun Jianguo, China's deputy chief of the general staff department, raised the issue during his talks with South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo in Singapore on the sidelines of the Asia Security Summit, also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, according to the official.

"The Chinese officer delivered his country's concern over the United States Forces Korea's alleged push to introduce the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on the peninsula," said the senior defense ministry official, who attended the meeting.

Washington has expressed its willingness to deploy the battery to better protect South Korea and some 28,000 U.S. troops stationed in the country from North Korea's threats.

In response, Han said the South Korean government "will judge and make a decision on the matter, putting a priority on our national interests," the official said.

As an integral part of the U.S.-led missile-defense system, THAAD is designed to shoot down short, medium and intermediate ballistic missiles at a higher altitude in their terminal phase using a hit-to-kill method.

Arguing that the U.S. missile-defense (MD) system also targets China, Beijing has publicly pressed Seoul not to accept the THAAD battery. In February, Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan also expressed concern to Han over the U.S. air shield system.

China and Russia view it as a threat to their security, and critics point out that it is part of a broader U.S. attempt to get South Korea to join its air shield, which could spark tensions in the region.

Seoul and Washington have said that no official consultations or decisions have taken place on the matter, with Seoul making it clear that it has no plan to purchase the THAAD system.

During the meeting on Sunday, the two sides also exchanged their assessment on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, where tensions are heightened further over North Korea's continued provocative actions. Earlier this month, Pyongyang announced a successful test-launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

Han asked for China's "special efforts" to induce North Korea to take the path of denuclearization and openness, as peace and stability of the peninsula "also carries significance for the future of China and all of Northeast Asia."

In response, the Chinese officer said Beijing "fully understands and shares" South Korea's concern, making it clear that China "does not want to see a nuclear North Korea and any war-like circumstances," according to the Seoul official.

The two sides also agreed to strive to further develop their defense ties, including the facilitation of an ongoing project to open a hotline between the defense ministers. Seoul also proposed that Beijing stage a joint anti-piracy drill between their overseas troops.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/full/2015/05/31/60/1200000000AEN20150531002051315F.html>

[Return to Top](#)

The Korea Herald – Seoul, South Korea

### **N. Korea Warns of 'Tragedy' from Failed U.S. Policy**

May 31, 2015

North Korea vowed Sunday to ensure a "balance of forces" with the United States through its continued development of nuclear weapons.

"As has been already proved in history, the only way to prevent a war between the DPRK and the U.S., which lack even elementary trust in each other and have long stood in mistrust and hostility only, is for the former to bolster



## ***USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal***

up its defense capabilities so as to ensure balance of forces," the North's foreign ministry said in a statement. The DPRK is the acronym for the communist nation's formal name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

It claimed the U.S. is to blame for the failure of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

Washington is rather "trying to escape from the responsibility for its totally foiled policy" toward Pyongyang, said the ministry.

The statement came after the top nuclear envoys from South Korea, the U.S. and Japan had a trilateral meeting in Seoul last week.

In the session, the North argued, the three parties attempted to distort the truth by giving the impression that they wanted to have a dialogue but the North refused.

"It is a well-known fact that the DPRK had long called for the resumption of dialogue without preconditions, making sincere efforts for it, but the U.S. prevented it, raising unreasonable 'preconditions,' " the ministry said.

It said the North's nuclear arsenal and missiles are "neither a means for threatening anyone nor a bargaining chip for something."

Those are "self-defensive deterrents to cope with the constant nuclear threat and military invasion from the U.S. and as a force of justice to decisively repel the enemy's invasion and deal a merciless retaliation in case a war breaks out," it said. "If the U.S. fails to draw a lesson any longer, the aftermath will be more tragic." (Yonhap)

<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150531000172>

[Return to Top](#)

Yonhap News Agency – Seoul, South Korea

### **Senate Defense Bill Defines N. Korea as 'Nuclear-Armed Country'**

June 2, 2015

WASHINGTON, June 1 (Yonhap) -- The Senate-drafted U.S. defense budget bill for next year defines North Korea as a "nuclear-armed country," a characterization that runs counter to the government's position that it won't recognize Pyongyang as a nuclear state.

The National Defense Authorization Act for 2016, introduced in the Senate last month by Sen. John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, made the definition in Section 1633 while assessing the global nuclear environment.

"During the 25 years preceding the date of the enactment of this Act, additional countries have obtained nuclear weapons. North Korea is a nuclear-armed country and Iran aspires to acquire a nuclear weapons capability," the draft bill said.

Even though North Korea is widely believed to have nuclear weapons, it is still considered unusual for an official document to term the communist nation as such. The U.S., South Korea and other countries have long maintained that the North won't be accepted as a nuclear power.

North Korea has conducted three underground nuclear tests so far, in 2006, 2009 and 2013. The country has also conducted a series of long-range missile or rocket launches since 1998. In its most recent launch in late 2012, the North succeeded in putting a satellite into orbit.

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Analysts have warned that it is only a matter of time until the North develops nuclear-tipped missiles. Some experts have recently warned that the communist nation's nuclear arsenal could expand to as many as 100 bombs by 2020.

The six-party talks aimed at resolving the North Korean standoff have been stalled since late 2008.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/06/02/52/0301000000AEN20150602000400315F.html>

[Return to Top](#)

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia

### **North Korean Media Say US Seeks to Unleash Biological Warfare against North Korea**

*The US Department of Defense (DOD) announced on 27 May that it had accidentally shipped live anthrax spores to labs in nine US states and a US military base in South Korea*

June 02, 2015

PYONGYANG, June 2. /TASS/. North Korea (DPRK) has sharply criticised the United States for US secret shipping of live anthrax germs into the territory of the Korean Peninsula. The North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) released a statement by a representative of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, saying that it is "an unforgivable crime" against the Korean people.

This incident proves that Washington is preparing to systematically destroy North Korea's people through biological warfare, the official said. The Committee representative also condemned South Korean authorities for concealing the accident and the lack of a proper reaction on their part. The South Korea government announced previously that this dangerous incident was not a violation of the agreement on the status of the US military contingent in the country.

The US Department of Defense (DOD) announced on 27 May that it had accidentally shipped live anthrax spores to labs in nine US states and a US military base in South Korea. The facilities that received the samples did not have systems in place to protect lab employees against anthrax exposure because they were expecting to receive spores that had been killed with radiation. It is not clear how many people were actually exposed. The DOD says that 22 people in South Korea are getting preventive treatment, but it has not confirmed how many people in the United States are being treated.

The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, which regulates all research on a set of dangerous pathogens called select agents, is working with the DOD to investigate how the incident occurred. In an extraordinary admission, the Pentagon revealed what it called an "inadvertent transfer of samples containing live *Bacillus anthracis*", or anthrax, took place at an unspecified time from a US Defense Department laboratory in Dugway, Utah.

According to South Korea's Yonhap news agency, as part of efforts to strengthen their alliance, South Korea and the United States have been conducting the Able Response Exercise (AR) to counter biological warfare threats since 2011. Seoul's defence ministry said the two countries are seeking to create a task force designed to deal with biological threats and pursue cooperative projects based on the results of the AR. By the end of this year, Seoul and Washington also plan to set up a joint surveillance portal for biological weapons, under which information on various types of contagious and endemic diseases will be uploaded.

<http://tass.ru/en/world/798280>

[Return to Top](#)



## ***USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal***

Global Times – Beijing, China

### **S. Korea Test-Fires Medium-Range Ballistic Missile**

Source: Xinhua

June 3, 2015

South Korea's military test-fired a ballistic missile with a range of at least 500 km under President Park Geun-hye's observation, the presidential office said on Wednesday.

Park visited the Anheung firing range in southwest South Korea for the first time in 30 years in the capacity of the head of state.

The state-run Agency for Defense Development (ADD) test-launched the ballistic missile, named Hyunmoo-2B, with a range of more than 500 km that covers all areas of the Korean Peninsula.

The successful development of medium-range ballistic missile came about two and a half years after the United States and South Korea revised guideline on ballistic missiles in October 2012.

Under the guideline revision, South Korea was allowed to expand the range of missiles from 300 km to 800 km. The ADD is reportedly developing a ballistic missile with a range of 800 km.

The developed 500-km missiles are forecast to be deployed to military bases under the Army's missile command by the end of this year.

If deployed, the missiles would strike nuclear and missile bases of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in emergency situations as part of the Kill Chain and the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) systems, which the South Korean military is building as its own missile defense program.

The test-firing of missiles came after the DPRK recently announced its capability of miniaturizing nuclear warheads small enough to be mounted onto ballistic missiles.

The DPRK is reportedly to have deployed Scud missiles with a range of 300-550 km, Rodong missiles ranging from 1,000 km to 1,300 km and Musudan missiles covering areas of about 3,000 km.

<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/925159.shtml>

[Return to Top](#)

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency

### **Russian Aerospace Defense Forces to Hold 200 Summer Exercises**

*According to Defense Ministry, Russia's Aerospace Defense Forces (ADF) will launch over 200 combat training exercises this summer starting Monday.*

31 May 2015

MOSCOW (Sputnik) – Russia's Aerospace Defense Forces (ADF) will launch over 200 combat training exercises this summer starting Monday, June 1, including as part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) united air defense system "Combat Commonwealth-2015," the Defense Ministry announced Sunday.

"In the summer period, ADF forces will conduct over 10 command and staff exercises with affiliated commands and units, three tactical live-fire exercises, including joint exercises of the united CIS air defense 'Combat Commonwealth-2015' with the use of S-400 'Triumf' and Pantsir-S [anti-aircraft weapons systems]," the ministry said in statement.

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"In total, approximately 200 combat training events are planned. This substantially increases the intensity of practical weapons training," the Defense Ministry's statement adds.

The Aerospace Defense Forces is a branch of the Russian Armed Forces responsible for air and missile defense. It was established in late 2011 to replace the Russian Space Forces and combine all space and some air defense components within one service.

Among other things, the ADF is tasked with detecting and intercepting ballistic missiles, monitoring space objects and preempting any potential threats in or from space, as well as launching military and civilian satellites.

<http://sputniknews.com/military/20150531/1022770535.html>

[Return to Top](#)

Tasnim News Agency – Tehran, Iran

### **Iran's Zarif: Differences Remain, Tight Schedule Ahead**

May 31, 2015

TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Iran's foreign minister and top negotiator said there still remain multiple sticking points in nuclear talks with world powers, adding that diplomats are going to work hard the next four weeks to explore the possibility of a final deal on Iran's nuclear program.

Speaking to reporters after a one-day meeting with US Secretary of State John Kerry in Geneva on Saturday, Mohammad Javad Zarif said the nuclear talks still include differences between the negotiating parties, both technical and political difference.

"We decided to work full-time during the next three or four weeks to see whether it is possible to reach an agreement or not," Zarif added.

He also reminded the negotiators to remain committed to the solutions that were reached in Lausanne in April, calling on them to refrain from making "excessive demands" or raising "irrelevant issues" in order to finish the job of drafting the text of the deal.

The next round of nuclear negotiations will be held in the Austrian capital, Vienna, on Thursday, June 4.

Iran and the Group 5+1 (Russia, China, the US, Britain, France and Germany) are in talks to hammer out a lasting accord that would end more than a decade of impasse over Tehran's civilian nuclear program.

On April 2, the two sides reached a framework nuclear agreement in Lausanne, Switzerland, with both sides committed to push for a final deal until the end of June.

<http://www.tasnimnews.com/english/Home/Single/756082>

[Return to Top](#)

FARS News Agency – Tehran, Iran

Sunday, May 31, 2015

### **ISIL Attacks Anbar Province's Residential Areas with Chlorine Payloads**

TEHRAN (FNA) - The ISIL terrorist group launched a chlorine attack on the residential areas of Al-Baghdadi district in Al-Anbar province, Western Iraq.



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"The ISIL attacked a residential compound in Al-Baghdadi district of Al-Anbar province with three rockets carrying chlorine gas payloads that caused suffocation for three children," Arabic-language Al-Sumaria news website quoted a provincial security source in Al-Baghdadi as saying on Sunday.

The security source, speaking on the condition of anonymity, confirmed that the affected children were transferred to a nearby hospital for treatment after inhaling the poisonous gas.

Earlier this month, Iraqi army troops backed by volunteer forces thwarted a chlorine gas attack by the ISIL terrorists in Salahuddin Province.

Mohammad Abbas, the commander of 6th Brigade of Badr Organization, said Iraqi forces foiled the attack near the Central city of Samarra, and also killed a dozen militants, who sought to launch a gas attack on the al-Rafiaat region Southwest of Samarra, al-Sumaria satellite TV network reported.

There have been reports that the Takfiri militants used internationally banned chlorine gas during attacks in areas near the Central city of Ramadi, the provincial capital of Anbar, in March.

<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940310001293>

[Return to Top](#)

The Miami Herald – Miami, FL

### **Obama: No Military Solution to Iran's Nuclear Program**

Associated Press (AP)

June 1, 2015

JERUSALEM -- President Barack Obama tells Israeli TV there is no military solution to Iran's nuclear program.

Channel 2 TV aired excerpts of the interview Monday.

Obama said "I can, I think, demonstrate, not based on any hope but on facts and evidence and analysis, that the best way to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon is a verifiable, tough agreement."

"Even if the United States participates, it would temporarily slow down an Iranian nuclear program but it will not eliminate it," he said. The full interview will be aired Tuesday.

Israel says the emerging nuclear agreement with Iran is a bad deal. It has said that a military option is still on the table to prevent Iran from getting the bomb. Israel views a nuclear-armed Iran a threat to its existence.

<http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article22824003.html>

[Return to Top](#)

Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) – Tehran, Iran

02 June 2015

### **Construction to begin at Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant in Fall: Rosatom**

Tehran, June 2, IRNA - The head of Russia's nuclear agency Rosatom, Sergey Kirienko, said that work on equipping the second and third units of Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant will begin in the fall of 2015.

Large-scale work is to begin in the fall of this year on equipping the second and third units of Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant, Russia's nuclear agency Rosatom head, Sergey Kirienko, said Monday.

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'Work will begin in the fall of this year,' Kirienko said during the plenary session of the Atomexpo-2015 forum.

The new units will have two reactors of the improved water-water (VVER) design. The reactors will produce 1,000 megawatts each, tripling Iran's nuclear power production capacity.

Iran anticipates a gradual roll-back of sanctions following a final deal on its disputed nuclear program, scheduled to be signed by a group of six world powers known as P5+1 and Tehran by July 1.

The Russian-Iranian agreement on the civil use of nuclear energy, followed by a deal to construct Iran's first nuclear power plant, dates as far back as 1992.

Russian-built Bushehr went online in 2011 and launched at full capacity in the summer of 2014.

An agreement to expand civilian nuclear energy cooperation and construct a total of eight additional nuclear reactors at Bushehr was signed between the sides on November 11, 2014.

In September 2014, Russian nuclear experts unveiled a project for the plant's second reactor unit, Bushehr-2.

<http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81631544/>

[Return to Top](#)

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia

### **Russian Arms Maker Ready to Supply S-300 Missiles to Iran**

*The company will be able to supply the air defense systems to Iran as soon as there's a new contract*

June 02, 2015

MOSCOW, June 2. /TASS/. Russia's leading arms manufacturer Almaz-Antei is prepared to supply S-300 missile systems to Iran, the concern's director general said on Tuesday.

"All restrictions have been lifted. When we have a contract, we will supply S-300 [missiles] to the Republic of Iran," Yan Novikov said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin lifted the ban on the S-300 supplies to Iran in April 2015.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia's voluntary embargo on deliveries of S-300 missile systems to Iran is no longer needed due to progress in the resolution of the situation around Iran's nuclear program.

"Initially, the decision to suspend the implementation of the contract, which was already signed and came into force, was made in September 2010," he recalled. "It was done in the interests of support for consolidated efforts of the six international negotiators to stimulate a maximally constructive process of talks on settlement of the situation around Iran's nuclear program."

The minister particularly stressed that "it was done absolutely voluntarily."

"Resolution 1929 of the Security Council, which was approved in 2010, just like any other UN resolutions did not impose any restrictions on deliveries of air defense weapons to Iran. I will emphasize, it was done in the spirit of goodwill to stimulate progress at the talks," he said.

### **Russia-Iran S-300 contract**

Under the 2007 contract, Moscow was to deliver to Tehran five divisions of the missile systems of medium range worth over \$800 million.

The Iranian side paid \$166.8 million in advance. However, until mid-2010 the systems were not supplied to Iran.





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In September 2010, then-President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree on measures on implementing the UN Security Council's resolution 1929 that in particular banned the S-300 supplies to Iran.

The contract was severed and the advance payment was sent back to the Islamic Republic.

<http://tass.ru/en/russia/798140>

[Return to Top](#)

CNN News.com – Atlanta, GA

### **U.S.: Report of Growing Iran Nuclear Fuel Stockpile Not 'Major Obstacle' to Deal**

By Jim Acosta and Jim Sciutto, CNN

Tuesday, June 2, 2015

*Washington (CNN)* A senior U.S. official on Tuesday dismissed the notion that recent assessments indicating Iran's nuclear fuel stockpile had grown were an obstacle to reaching a nuclear deal with Tehran.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, a U.N. watchdog organization, released a report last week saying that Iran's stockpile had grown during the country's interim agreement to keep its nuclear program in check during negotiations with the U.S. and five other world powers on a final agreement curbing the program. The New York Times first reported on the IAEA assessment that the stockpile had grown by 20%.

Asked about the report, the senior U.S. official said it was "fair to say it's something we're watching. But the notion that it's some major obstacle is not accurate."

The official acknowledged that the U.N. agency's findings were less than ideal. "But their whole program is less than ideal," the official added, arguing that Iran is still "in compliance" with the Joint Plan of Action interim agreement.

The IAEA report, however, stated the agency is uncertain about whether Iran is fully complying with the current framework agreement.

"The Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities," the report said.

The size of Iran's nuclear fuel stockpile remains one of the sticking points before the June 30 deadline for a final deal. However, the senior U.S. official pointed to larger areas of concern, such as guaranteeing that inspectors will have access to sites where Iran may be suspected of using its nuclear program for military purposes.

A senior Iranian diplomat involved in the nuclear negotiations told CNN that the increase in the nuclear stockpile was a "technical issue" that the IAEA is aware of.

"At the end of June, the amount of the stockpile will be the same as it was at the time of the interim agreement," the diplomat said.

State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said that under the interim agreement, "Iran can fluctuate its numbers in terms of the stockpile. They can go up or they can go down, as long as at the end of a fixed date they are back down below a number."

<http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/02/politics/iran-nuclear-fuel-stockpile-iaea/>

[Return to Top](#)

**Issue No.1168, 05 June 2015**

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Bloomberg Business News – New York, NY

## **Iran Military Prowess Advances Amid Nuclear Talks, Pentagon Says**

By Anthony Capaccio

June 3, 2015

Iran continues to develop technologies that “could be applicable to nuclear weapons,” including ballistic missiles, at the same time it’s working to complete a deal to curb its nuclear program, the U.S. Defense Department said.

Iran has “fulfilled its obligations” under the Joint Plan of Action reached with the U.S. and five other world powers and has “paused progress” in parts of its nuclear program, according to an unclassified summary from a Pentagon assessment of Iran’s military capability.

The conclusions are similar to those in last year’s version of the annual report mandated by Congress, but the new summary took into account the nuclear talks that are heading toward a self-imposed June 30 deadline. The full report, dated in January and including classified details, was submitted last week to congressional defense committees.

White House spokesman Josh Earnest told reporters Wednesday that while he hadn’t seen the Pentagon report, the potential military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program are “one thing we have indicated would need to be resolved” in any accord with Iran. He also said that even successful negotiations on nuclear issues wouldn’t resolve all the U.S. concerns about Iran’s actions.

“Covert activities appear to be continuing unabated” as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains a key tool of Iran’s foreign policy and power projection, “particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen,” the Pentagon report found.

According to the assessment, Iran’s military doctrine is primarily defensive, intended to insulate the regime “from the consequence of Tehran’s more aggressive policies, such as use of covert action and terrorism, rather than as a means to project Iranian power.”

“The ongoing civil war in Syria and the instability in Iraq have tested, but not fundamentally altered, this posture,” it said.

### **Russian System**

The doctrine “is designed to deter an attack, survive an initial strike, and retaliate against an aggressor to force a diplomatic solution to hostilities,” it said.

One example of improving its chances to survive an initial strike is Iran’s success in reaching an agreement to buy Russia’s air defense system, the S-300. Vladimir Kozhin, the Kremlin’s top official for the arms trade, said in an interview on Tuesday that Russia plans to start shipping the systems to Iran by next year.

Iran also continues to develop its capabilities to control the Strait of Hormuz -- the No. 1 global choke point for oil transit -- and avenues of approach in the event of a military conflict.

It’s “quietly fielding increasingly lethal weapon systems, including more advanced naval mines, small but capable submarines, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, coastal defense cruise missile batteries, attack craft, and antiship-capable missiles,” the Pentagon said.

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-03/iran-military-prowess-advances-amid-nuclear-talks-pentagon-says>

[Return to Top](#)



## **USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal**

The Washington Free Beacon – Washington, D.C.

### **Experts: Iran Negotiators Ignore Missiles at Their Own Peril**

*Missile tech development a 'litmus test' for Iranian intentions*

By Emma-Jo Morris

June 3, 2015

The State Department's focus on Iran's nuclear capacity at the expense of missile technology could hinder the effort to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons, according to experts who spoke at a Tuesday panel discussion hosted by the Hudson Institute.

In negotiations with Iran, the United States has focused on nuclear proliferation without considering the regime's continued development of missile technology, according to Dr. David Cooper, chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. Missile technology "turns out to be a remarkably accurate litmus test about any state's nuclear intentions," Cooper said.

"Long-range missile programs really only make economic, political, or military sense in the broader context of an ambition to become a nuclear weapons power."

Despite being treated as a secondary concern to nuclear power by the State Department, Cooper said missiles should be added and dealt with in nuclear negotiations, as opposed to being treated as two isolated issues.

He said that given that a warhead on conventional missiles can be designed for a nuke, Iran's possession of ICBMs is an absolute indicator of the regime's ambition to become a nuclear power.

The president must address and ask Tehran to give up possible nuclear delivery systems, such as long-range and land-attack cruise missiles, for the sake of the preservation of regional and international security, according to Cooper.

"If Iran were to make a bolt for serious nuclear weapons power status, along the same lines as Pakistan or India—if we think in those terms, then the missiles, far from being peripheral, actually are, rather, a heed to the whole solution for the Iranians ... giving Iran a blanket pass on any and all of its missile programs, to include its longest range and most threatening programs and developments, really does raise some troubling questions about the deal," Cooper said.

President Obama has said negotiations afford the United States more time to respond should Iran develop nuclear weapons.

"We know that even if they wanted to cheat, we would have at least a year [to react], which is three times longer than we'd have right now," he told the *New York Times* in April.

Dr. Thomas Karako, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the United States has already lost its chance to head off missile development. Given the concessions and framework laid out thus far, he said, the United States is left to negotiate with only sanctions to use as leverage. Iran has the upper hand, as they have expressed willingness to walk away from talks with the president, according to Karako.

"There is a spectrum of responses ... if missiles were in the talks, we would be having a different conversation," Karako said. "We have failed and lost our chance at non-proliferation ... that optimal position is now in the 'coulda, shoulda, woulda' category."

<http://freebeacon.com/national-security/experts-iran-negotiators-ignore-missiles-at-their-own-peril/>

[Return to Top](#)

Issue No.1168, 05 June 2015

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Mehr News Agency – Tehran, Iran

4 June 2015

### **No Access beyond NPT: Araghchi**

VIENNA, Jun. 4 (MNA) – Iran's senior negotiator elaborates on the framework of the access to Iran's nuclear facilities according to prospective deal.

Upon arrival in Vienna, Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi explained the concept of allowing IAEA access to some of Iran's sensitive sites in response to questions about Iran's concerns.

Araghchi who is heading Iranian negotiating team at the deputy level, arrived in Vienna early in the morning on Thursday and said that Iran would allow controlled access within the NPT framework or the Additional Protocol. Iran has not decided about the Additional Protocol yet, and Araghchi conditioned it upon acceptance.

Referring to Russian representative's comment that the talks are near final, the senior Iranian diplomat recounted that the main part of the principles are worked out but the additional appendixes are still way to go.

Pointing to the complexities, Araghchi expressed hope that the draft would be finalized by the deadline of June 30.

The Iranian diplomat rejected the idea of inspection of military sites and called it out of agenda as it is not included in NPT and reiterated that according to NPT, just controlled access is possible.

<http://en.mehrnews.com/news/107679/No-access-beyond-NPT-Araghchi>

[Return to Top](#)

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia

### **Russia Says 'No Crisis or Setback' in Iran Nuclear Talks; Experts Continue Work**

*No dates have been set yet for further meetings involving political directors from the six powers and Tehran*

June 04, 2015

VIENNA, June 4. /TASS/. Negotiations on Tehran's nuclear program reveal no signs of a crisis or a setback, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said on Thursday.

Ryabkov told TASS that in the current round of talks between Iran and six world powers in Vienna, "not many concrete agreements have been reached".

"We have to face a situation that is quite usual for talks on difficult issues, when the stakes are high and the price for steps towards each other is growing," he said, noting however that this meant "neither a setback nor a crisis."

"There are no signs of a rethink of what has been agreed earlier," the diplomat said.

At the same time, Ryabkov added that "there is a sense that we are running out of time".

"We mustn't lose a day if want to successfully complete negotiations within the established deadline," he said, noting that experts from Iran and the United States, France, Germany, Russia, China and Britain "will continue work today and tomorrow".

No dates have been set yet for further meetings involving political directors from the six powers and Tehran but "a decision will be made in coming days", Ryabkov said.

Following a negotiating marathon in Switzerland in early April, Iran and the six powers - the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany - began the difficult process of finalising by June 30 a historic deal that could end 12 years of negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear programme.



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The Vienna talks on June 4 brought together senior foreign ministry officials, nuclear and other experts representing Iran and the P5+1 group.

<http://tass.ru/en/world/798924>

[Return to Top](#)

Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) – Tehran, Iran

05 June 2015

### **Deputy Iran, US FM's Pursue Completing Agreement Text**

Vienna, June 5, IRNA – Iranian deputy foreign ministers Seyyed Abbas Araqchi and Majid Takhte-Ravanjchi began talks with their US counterpart Wendy Sherman at 9:30 local time here (12:00 Tehran time) aimed at completing text of the final comprehensive agreement.

Sherman who has been present in this round of talks on Thursday before the Friday meeting presented a detailed report to the US Foreign Secretary John Kerry in a phone talk with him earlier in the day.

Araqchi and Ravanchi on Thursday in separate meetings with their European, Russian and Chinese counterparts consulted on the process of drafting the final agreement.

Simultaneously with the Iranian and US deputy foreign ministers' meeting the two sides' technicians' teams, too, will continue working on the appendixes of the agreement. Those talks are led by Hamid Baidinezhad and Stephan clement.

The general meeting of the Iran-5+1 Group, led by Araqchi and deputy director of EU foreign policy Helga Schmid was the starter of this sixth round of talks.

The US Foreign Secretary Spokeswoman Mary Harf has said last night that the remaining issues before signing the final agreement include a time schedule for termination of the sanctions in return for Iran's practical acts.

She said that the basis for work is the Lausanne Statement that is accepted by Iran and the negotiators are accordingly turning the existing axes into related details on access to Iran's nuclear facilities and the political section of the agreement.

<http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81634552/>

[Return to Top](#)

Tasnim News Agency – Tehran, Iran

### **Commander: Iran Not to Allow Even 'Restricted Access' to Military Sites**

June 05, 2015

TEHRAN (Tasnim) – A senior Iranian military commander underlined that the Islamic Republic will not allow any access to the country's military centers even in a "restricted or controlled" form under the pretext of inspection of nuclear sites.

Speaking on Friday, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri denounced continued remarks raised by some officials from the US and other members of the Group 5+1 (Russia, China, the US, Britain, France and Germany) about the inspection of Iran's military sites.

**Issue No.1168, 05 June 2015**

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"We will not allow any visiting of military centers, whether it is limited, controlled, non-free or in any other form," the commander noted, adding that Iran's opposition to such a visit has repeatedly been emphasized by Iranian leadership and military commanders.

The remarks came a day after a top Iranian diplomat involved in the nuclear talks with six world powers, Seyed Abbas Araqchi, said If an agreement is reached between Iran and the Group 5+1 based on which the Additional Protocol would be implemented, any access given to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors will be "managed".

Araqchi underlined that what the Additional Protocol entails is "managed access" to nuclear facilities and that "in our view, managed access does not mean visiting or inspection."

Earlier on April 9, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei also categorically rejected foreign access to the country's "security and defensive" sectors under the pretext of nuclear monitoring.

<http://www.tasnimnews.com/english/Home/Single/760672>

[Return to Top](#)

The Independent – London, U.K.

### **Isis Could Obtain Nuclear Weapon from Pakistan, Warns India**

By Alexander Sehmer

Sunday, 31 May 2015

India's defence minister has voiced concern that the radical Islamist group Isis could obtain a nuclear weapon from "states like Pakistan".

Rao Inderjit Singh made the comments on the sidelines of the Shangri-La regional security conference in Singapore, Bloomberg has reported.

"With the rise of Isis in West Asia, one is afraid to an extent that perhaps they might get access to a nuclear arsenal from states like Pakistan," Bloomberg quoted him as saying.

Earlier in the month Isis suggested it could attempt to buy its first nuclear weapon within a year and that it might come from Pakistan.

An article in its propaganda magazine Dabiq said: "The Islamic State has billions of dollars in the bank, so they call on their wilāyah [official] in Pakistan to purchase a nuclear device through weapons dealers with links to corrupt officials in the region."

The article, supposedly authored by John Cantlie, the British journalist held hostage by Isis and regularly used by the group in its propaganda campaigns, admits the scenario is "far-fetched".

Political analysts also see the scenario as unlikely.

Don't stress - #ISIS can't buy a nuclear weapon New article by @MJ\_Cruickshank <http://t.co/ArSW64kMGb>  
[pic.twitter.com/jRfMqfR7p9](http://pic.twitter.com/jRfMqfR7p9)

— Conflict News (@rConflictNews) May 23, 2015

Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme began in the 1970s in response to India's development and testing of its own nuclear device.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist who helped develop Pakistan's nuclear bomb, confessed in 2004 that his network had sold nuclear know-how on the black market to states such as North Korea and Iran.



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But both Pakistan and India rank poorly in terms of nuclear security. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative's 'nuclear materials security index', out of 25 countries Pakistan is ranked 22nd, while India is ranked 23rd.

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/india-warns-isis-could-obtain-nuclear-weapon-from-pakistan-10287276.html>

[Return to Top](#)

The Economic Times – New Delhi, India

### **India, US to Sign Military Cooperation Agreement, Talk on Missile Defence, WMD Proliferation**

By Manu Pubby, ET Bureau

1 June 2015

NEW DELHI: On his first tour to India as US Defence Secretary, Ashton Carter is making it a point to start with a visit to the Visakhapatnam based Eastern Naval Command that is tasked to maintain Indian presence in the South China sea region and the Strait of Malacca.

In what is seen as a result-oriented visit, India and US will not only sign a new defence cooperation agreement to take ahead from a 2005 pact but are also set to explore the possibilities of cooperating in the development of missile defence systems and take forward proposals for joint development of military equipment. Carter, who is coming to India after a stopover in Vietnam following the Shangri La dialogue, is meeting the top Indian leadership, including PM Narendra Modi.

Officials say that the new 10-year defence framework agreement being signed during the visit will contain a specific reference to the Defense Technology & Trade Initiative (DTTI) that seeks to co-develop defence systems. Among the proposals expected from Washington is the possibility for cooperation in the development of a new basic trainer for the Indian Air Force.

The Defence Ministry has already tasked HAL to develop a new turboprop trainer aircraft to meet the requirement of close to 100 planes needed by the air force and US is expected to offer assistance in the program. A possibility being looked at is assisting HAL to develop a new aircraft on the lines of the Hawker Beechcraft T 6 Texan II trainer.

Besides, the two sides will explore possible cooperation in the advanced field of missile defence systems. While India is developing an indigenous missile shield, the last two tests have not been successful.

The US has offered assistance in the missile defence system in the past too but given the recent upswing in relations, more concrete talks are expected during the visit. Discussions will also take place on increasing capabilities to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-to-sign-military-cooperation-agreement-talk-on-missile-defence-wmd-proliferation/articleshow/47494296.cms>

[Return to Top](#)

**Issue No.1168, 05 June 2015**

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The Indian Express – Mumbai, India

### **Pakistan Says It Will Not Sign Non-Proliferation Treaty**

*Already, 190 states have signed the treaty, which came into force in 1970. But South Asia's both nuclear states, India and Pakistan, have stayed out of it.*

By Press Trust of India (PTI)

June 3, 2015

Washington -- Pakistan has said it will not sign the “discriminatory” nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry said as he held talks with US officials in Washington on security, strategic stability and non-proliferation issues.

“It is a discriminatory treaty. Pakistan has the right to defend itself, so Pakistan will not sign the NPT,” he said.

Already, 190 states have signed the treaty, which came into force in 1970. But South Asia’s both nuclear states, India and Pakistan, have stayed out of it.

Pakistan’s categorical refusal to sign the treaty goes against the US desire to promote NPT’s compliance. But US officials have avoided criticising in public Pakistan’s position on this and other issues.

Chaudhry, when asked to underline the steps Pakistan had taken to protect its nuclear assets, said, “We have established a multi-layer system and a strong command and control system”.

He assured the international community that Pakistan would maintain a “credible minimum deterrence, but it is not in an arms race with anyone”.

Chaudhry pointed out that for some time India had been working on a massive build-up of conventional weapons.

“Pakistan is not asking for a parity with India but we do want a system of check and balance. Such a balance is necessary to promote peace,” Dawn newspaper quoted Chaudhry as saying.

“Pakistan believes in the concept of comprehensive strategic stability, which includes conventional weapons balance, nuclear restraint, resolution of the outstanding issues,” he said.

Chaudhry said that Pakistan had proved its ability to fully protect its nuclear assets by not allowing the current wave of terrorism to reach anywhere near a nuclear facility.

“The measures we have taken, no other country has and it is recognised by other countries too. We have fulfilled our responsibility. There is zero tolerance for such activities.”

The foreign secretary said that Pakistan also had a right to the civil nuclear cooperation arrangement that the US had with India.

“Our energy needs are more acute. Our power generation met international standards. All our facilities are under IAEA safeguards. And so we have a right to have access to civil nuclear technology,” he said.

The foreign secretary rejected a suggestion that IS and other militant groups could seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

<http://indianexpress.com/article/world/pakistan-says-it-will-not-sign-non-proliferation-treaty/>

[Return to Top](#)



## ***USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal***

The Express Tribune – Karachi, Pakistan

### **US Confident of Pakistan's Ability to Safeguard Nuclear Weapons**

*Pakistan stresses the need for access to peaceful nuclear technology as a socioeconomic imperative*

By Web Desk

June 3, 2015

ISLAMABAD: Both Pakistan and the United States have reaffirmed the importance of preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery to states as well as non-state actors.

During the seventh round of the US-Pakistan Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation (SSS&NP) Working Group in Washington on Tuesday, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller met with Pakistan Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry. The SSS&NP is a working group under the auspices of the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue.

According to a joint statement released on Wednesday, both delegations had a productive exchange of views on issues of mutual importance, including international efforts to enhance nuclear security, peaceful applications of nuclear energy, non-proliferation, export controls, regional stability and security.

The US delegation welcomed Pakistan's efforts to harmonise its strategic trade controls with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export control regimes. Both sides emphasised the desirability of continued outreach to integrate Pakistan into the international non-proliferation regime.

Pakistan stressed the need for access to peaceful nuclear technology as a socioeconomic imperative.

US expressed full confidence in Pakistan's indigenous efforts to strengthen nuclear security, and welcomed Pakistan's efforts to strengthen export controls and border security including through installation of radiation portal monitors at border crossings, as well as Pakistan's hosting of IAEA training activities at its Nuclear Security Center of Excellence.

The Pakistan delegation welcomed the understanding reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and P5+1 on April 2, underscored the importance of resolving the nuclear issue peacefully, and expressed its earnest hope that the parties concerned will be able to finalise a comprehensive settlement.

Meanwhile, the US underscored its continued efforts to realise the agenda set forth in President Obama's 2009 Prague speech, including the importance of commencing negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), noting its readiness to address all issues raised in the course of negotiations, as allowed for in CD 1299.

Pakistan, however, underlined its preference for a broader Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) that addresses the asymmetries in existing stocks and highlighted that Pakistan's position on FMT will be determined by its national security interests and the objectives of strategic stability in South Asia.

Both sides noted the high priority that arms control has for the international community. The US outlined its nuclear stockpile reductions, explained its efforts to seek congressional approval to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and reaffirmed its commitment not to conduct further nuclear test explosions.

Pakistan reiterated its support for CTBT-related resolutions in the UN General Assembly, and its consistent stance that it will not be the first in its region to resume nuclear testing.

Reaffirming the prime minister's 2014 statement in the General Assembly, Pakistan reiterated its longstanding proposal of pursuing nuclear restraint, conventional equilibrium and conflict resolution in South Asia.

**Issue No.1168, 05 June 2015**

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Pakistan also echoed its commitment to Credible Minimum Deterrence and to pursue measures in the region aimed at building confidence and lessening the risk of armed conflict.

Both sides also discussed international efforts aimed at improving nuclear security with a central role of IAEA including through the high level focus by the Nuclear Security Summit process and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Representatives of both the countries also took note of the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty. The delegations discussed issues related to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and would continue such consultations.

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/897094/us-confident-of-pakistans-ability-to-safeguard-nuclear-weapons/>

[Return to Top](#)

The New Indian Express – Chennai, India

### **Pakistan Rules Out Sharing Nukes with Saudis, Anyone Else**

*Pakistan's foreign secretary is ruling out sharing atomic weapons with Saudi Arabia as world powers and Iran near a possible nuclear agreement.*

By Associated Press (AP)

June 5, 2015

WASHINGTON: Pakistan's foreign secretary is ruling out sharing atomic weapons with Saudi Arabia as world powers and Iran near a possible nuclear agreement.

Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry says any such speculation is "unfounded and baseless."

He says the nuclear arsenal is solely for Pakistan's national security, and Pakistan won't sell or transfer weapons or advanced technology.

Chaudhry spoke to reporters as he finished a Washington visit Thursday. He was asked about concerns that Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries could seek nuclear capabilities to match Iran's.

Pakistan has long been among the world's greatest proliferation threats, having shared weapons technology with North Korea, Iran and Libya.

But Chaudhry says his country has cracked down hard in recent years.

<http://m.newindianexpress.com/world/475976>

[Return to Top](#)

The Diplomat – Tokyo, Japan

OPPINION/Asian Defense

### **Why North Korea Wants Mutually Assured Destruction**

*A look at what Pyongyang is seeking and why.*

By Van Jackson for *The Diplomat*

June 04, 2015

North Korea's rhetoric suggests it's willing and able to launch nuclear first-strikes on South Korea, Japan, and even the United States. Such rhetoric promotes fear among those who believe that any strikes or retaliation against

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Pyongyang could lead to a nuclear conflict. But such a North Korean nuclear posture, described as “asymmetric escalation,” is simply not credible during peacetime. Instead, North Korea is on a trajectory to establish a secure second-strike nuclear posture that all but guarantees regime survival and freedom to coerce South Korea from a position of safety.

The prevailing wisdom about North Korean nuclear strategy does not draw a distinction between peace and war. Yet there are reasons to expect that its nuclear strategy would be different under these very different circumstances.

As I discussed last week, it's highly likely that in the midst of a conflict, North Korea will adopt an asymmetric escalation posture. Not only does North Korea lack the resources to wage a protracted conflict, but there's a serious possibility that U.S. and South Korean military actions in a conflict — targeting air defenses, amphibious assaults, building up military forces — will inadvertently signal to North Korea that regime change is coming. Whether that's what the alliance intends to do or not, sending such a signal to North Korea incentivizes them to launch nuclear strikes out of desperation.

But, for all the reasons I articulated last week, such a posture makes little sense in peacetime. North Korea originally pursued nuclear weapons because of regime insecurity, perceiving U.S. nuclear weapons as a kind of trump card that it couldn't out-escalate.

So why suspect North Korea seeks an assured retaliation capability? Although North Korea lacks sufficient capability for an assured retaliation nuclear posture today, there are several reasons to expect that North Korea is making a deliberate move toward such a peacetime strategy.

First, assured retaliation, especially during peacetime, is the most stable of the various types of nuclear posture because it reserves nuclear use for second-strikes while other posture types incentivize first strikes. It is of course possible to have an assured retaliation capability and be willing to launch nuclear first-strikes, but as a strategy for achieving a political effect, that would equate to an asymmetric escalation strategy, only with a more secure foundation.

Second, North Korea has an incentive not to spark a war that would lead to regime change. An assured retaliation capability guarantees that regime change could not be forced from the outside without nuclear conflict, which in turn conditions U.S. and South Korean decision-making to weigh the cost of nuclear attacks in pursuing regime change.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, while we lack “smoking gun” evidence about North Korean intentions, there are multiple observable North Korean decisions that we would also expect to observe with a state moving toward an assured retaliation strategy. Survivability of a nuclear force has several requirements: geographically dispersed weapons locations; multiple types of nuclear delivery vehicles; and a sufficiently large inventory of nuclear weapons. The “most likely” capability that assures nuclear survivability is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability because of its mobility and difficulty of detection.

All of these conditions fit with North Korea's current trajectory. North Korea's navy is making investments in SLBM technology and modernization of its submarine fleet — a highly expensive undertaking. Its nuclear facilities are not consolidated but spread across at least six locations around the country. And its expected delivery vehicles for nuclear strikes include multiple types of ballistic missiles from multiple missile garrisons, KN-08 road-mobile transporter-erector launchers (TELs), the IL-28 bomber, Soviet era submarines, and surface ships.

Although there is no consensus threshold in the nuclear literature for when survivability is achieved, the nuclear-capable KN-08 and SLBM systems in particular make North Korea's nuclear force much more survivable.

A nuclear North Korea with an assured retaliation posture is a huge problem for the alliance. As I've often recommended (examples here, here, and here), the alliance needs to embrace the prospect of limited war with North Korea. My reasoning was based on the expectation that North Korea would perceive its own assured

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retaliation posture as allowing it to enact violence against South Korea without serious expectations of regime change, or even retaliation. If that happens, the only way to disabuse North Korea of such a notion without actually waging a nuclear conflict is to be prepared to fight back, but in a controlled manner with limited objectives (i.e., objectives short of regime change).

The status quo allows North Korea to achieve an assured retaliation capability, which in turn heightens the prospects of North Korea coercing South Korea and engaging in nuclear blackmail during any crisis. This shouldn't be allowed to happen, but nothing is being done to stop it.

To avoid that fate, the alliance is going to be forced to conduct preventive strikes on suspected nuclear sites, or engage in preventive negotiations that freeze and rollback its current trajectory. The window of opportunity for change is closing.

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<http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/why-north-korea-wants-mutually-assured-destruction/>

[Return to Top](#)

The Hill – Washington, D.C.

OPINION/Congress Blog

June 03, 2015

### **Nuclear Weapons: The 'All of the Above' Strategy**

By John Isaacs and Greg Terry

This week, the Senate is scheduled to begin consideration of the annual defense authorization bill. In a move detached from budgetary reality, the bill backs an unaffordable plan to modernize or replace nearly every aspect of the United States' oversized nuclear arsenal. It is an "all of the above" strategy that avoids any of the hard, but necessary, strategic choices. This is the budgetary equivalent of trying to drive 50 miles with 25 miles worth of gas and the Pentagon will not be happy with the results.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 (NDAA) passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee includes a long wish list of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The current plan is to design and build 12 new nuclear missile submarines, as many as 100 new nuclear-capable bombers, as many as 1,100 new nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, and to modernize around 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles and the various nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal. In addition, the Committee requires the modernization and replacement of forward-deployed nuclear weapons, dual capable fighter-bomber aircraft and perhaps the development of intermediate range nuclear weapons.

The Pentagon itself is concerned about the affordability of this plan. Frank Kendall, the Pentagon's Undersecretary of Acquisitions, characterized the nuclear modernization plans as "unaffordable." He went on to say that updating all three legs of the U.S. nuclear force—delivery systems by land, air, and sea—concurrently will fail unless the Department of Defense can secure an additional \$10 to \$12 billion annually by 2021 – an extremely unlikely scenario.

Kendall is not alone. "The challenge here is that we have to recapitalize all three legs [of the nuclear triad] and we don't have the money to do it," explained General James Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



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Over the next decade, the United States plans to spend \$348 billion on its nuclear forces, or about \$35 billion a year, according to a 2015 Congressional Budget Office report. Reports conducted by the congressionally-appointed National Defense Panel and Center for Nonproliferation Studies indicate the nuclear arsenal could cost as much as \$1 trillion to modernize. The official cost of this “all of the above” nuclear force modernization is a classified secret.

These exorbitant plans are likely to lead to defense budget tradeoffs, as neither the Air Force nor Navy can afford to fully fund both their nuclear and conventional forces. The National Defense Panel, which included former Secretary of Defense William Perry, retired four star General John Abizaid and former Senator and distinguished Heritage Foundation fellow Jim Talent, predicted this: “recapitalization of the triad . . . under current budget constraints is unaffordable” and the \$600 billion – \$1 trillion cost “would likely come at the expense of needed improvements in conventional forces.”

But Congress refuses to make the tough choices now about what capabilities are ‘essential’ and which are ‘nice to have.’

Instead, Congress has authorized yet another budget gimmick called the “National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund,” which moves the nuclear submarine program from the Navy’s account to the defense-wide budget. This changes the accounting, but as Undersecretary Kendall acknowledged, it fails to fix the actual affordability problem.

A potential consequence of the “all the above” strategy: build a smaller number of each weapon at a substantially higher unit cost. There is ample precedent for this option; the Air Force planned to build 132 B-2 nuclear bombers and ended up with only 21 and the MX Peacekeeper missile was whittled down from 200 to 50. Similarly, the Navy wanted 24 Ohio-class Submarines and 32 Zumwalt-class Destroyers, but received only 18 and 3 respectively.

But this bill is not yet law. Perhaps when the full Senate takes up the NDAA, some sensible senators will propose some alternatives to the unaffordable “all the above” strategy. The Senate can and should work to improve national security and better allocate defense resources, starting with a realistic plan for modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

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<http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/243807-nuclear-weapons-the-all-of-the-above-strategy>

[Return to Top](#)

Firstpost - Noida, India

OPINION/Commentary

### **China's Defence White Paper Sees Threats in Local Wars, Not Major Powers**

By Jaideep Prabhu

June 5, 2015

A couple of days ago, China released its latest Defence White Paper in which it outlined the direction and scope of its military modernisation efforts.

As with the release of every such document, the immediate question is: 'What's new?' The honest answer is, 'Not much.' The White Paper has never been the vehicle through which Beijing announces its policy changes; usually, these documents, about nine of them since 1998, reiterate already announced policies and tweak old policies a little to factor in the Communist Party of China's (CPC's) latest threat perception. This means that the White Papers are fairly useless to strategists or Sinologists but may be of some use to political leaders who tend to have diverse demands on their attention.

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The 2015 White Paper starts typically with a brief assessment of the security situation China faces and the changes it expects in the proximate future. It repeats the standard rhetoric from Beijing of seeking only cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Beijing perceives the international environment to be fairly peaceful and stable with little risk of a major war in the foreseeable future. However, the CPC is concerned about threats arising from hegemonism, power politics, and neo-interventionism which may encourage terrorist activities, ethnic, border, and territorial disputes; local wars, therefore, remain a threat.

China's political and military confidence of recent years comes from its conviction that the world's economic centre of gravity is shifting rapidly back to Asia. Its primary concern is the US in the western Pacific but Japan's proposed gradual militarisation has alarmed Beijing. In perhaps a veiled reference to India, the White Paper also mentions foreign countries interfering in affairs involving the South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines get a similar mention for the Senkakus and China rounds off its list of potential threats with a mention of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.

Interestingly, the last two did not merit a mention in the previous white paper two years ago. Several incidents involving Uighurs in recent months make the addition of Xinjiang an understandable addition, but Tibet is a little surprising. The paper mentions the United States and Japan by name less than in earlier years, indicating that China has become more confident of its anti-access/area denial tactics against these two potential rivals.

The CPC has not altered its views on the role of the military - defending Chinese interests, participating in relief operations, international security cooperation, and preserving the stability of the state. Beijing's paranoia about outside powers trying to foment a revolution, though much reduced since the days of Mao Zedong, has still not gone away completely.

But what can we expect to see in China's defence spending and its areas of interest? Unlike the 2013 white paper, there are no mentions of units, military districts, or the strength of various branches of the Chinese military. However, the general outlook appears similar - the Revolution in Military Affairs has an inherent and irresistible push, according to Beijing, towards the development of long-range weapons systems, stealth, unmanned platforms, precision weapons, and the use of cyber and outer spaces. The focus on cyber and space-based assets for communication, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and surveillance is clear from the mention - fear? - of the modern "informationised" battlefield 22 times in a short, 5,500-word document.

Operationally, the People's Liberation Army will reorient its mission from merely theatre defence to trans-theatre mobility. This sounds a little like India's much-vaunted Cold Start doctrine but something the Chinese might actually be able to pull off given their superior infrastructure. The PLA intends to develop specially-skilled units for different terrains and tasks and train them for closely coordinated operations. The multi-functional, modular units allow the PLA greater operational flexibility for small-scale operations in localised conflicts of the kind the CPC perceives China to be occupied with in the foreseeable future.

The PLA Navy's role has been expanded from offshore water defence to include open seas protection. This likely means the defence of new Chinese maritime claims and the assets Beijing might place in disputed waters. To this end, Beijing's interest in acquiring additional aircraft carriers makes perfect sense - the space around a carrier group will be able to create little mobile pockets of Chinese sovereignty. This expanded role is of great concern not just for China's immediate neighbours but also Indonesia and Australia. Fielding a blue-water navy has long been a Chinese ambition but open seas protection moves beyond that to some serious force projection.

Until now, China has relied on the international system to keep its sea lanes of communication safe; henceforth, the PLA will take a direct interest in ensuring their security.

The PLA Air Force will maintain its current role of early warning, air defence and offence, and force projection while modernising itself. A small but crucial addition to its role from 2013 will be "information counter-measures." In essence, China's military strategists have observed over the past quarter century how the United States fights its wars. Greater reliance on aerial assets for positioning, reconnaissance, communications, targeting, and electronic counter-measures is a huge force multiplier for ground forces and is something the Chinese are interested in replicating. To this end, the PLAAF's jurisdiction will extend into space as well.

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Of particular concern to India is the profile of the PLA Second Artillery Force, the units in charge of China's nuclear arsenal. Beijing has always adhered to a no-first-use (NFU) nuclear policy ever since its first nuclear test in October 1964. But, in 2013, the manner in which this assurance was worded became ambiguous. That ambiguity remains in this latest edition of Beijing's white paper too - the document reads, "China has always pursued the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy.... China will *unconditionally not use* or threaten to use *nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states*..." Again, it is not clear if Beijing's no-first-use posture applies to nuclear weapons states or not.

One might argue that Beijing does not view India as a nuclear weapons state (NWS) as per the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, therefore, the policy applies to India. Yet China has shown the ability to be surprisingly pragmatic when it serves it and the possession of nuclear weapons might confer NWS status for military purposes. Beijing's no-first-use declaration, which critics, with some justification, have always considered empty words, in all likelihood does not apply to India. Delhi must take this into consideration when it next updates its own nuclear posture.

Besides this significant reorientation, the PLASAF will modernise its delivery systems and warheads and work on technologies to improve its deterrence, early warning, survivability, and counterattack capabilities as well as medium and long-range precision strikes.

The rest of the document lays out the PLA's goals to streamline and modernise logistics, augment its war reserves, improve rules and standards, and innovate on modes of support. Officers will be given more opportunities to study military strategy and operations so that they may be able to introduce more effective principles and methods in their units. Troops will be given more "realistic" combat training and will strive for a high degree of combat readiness and alertness. The reserve force will be expanded and given better training to integrate them better with the regular military.

The PLA has stepped back from participating in the construction of civilian infrastructure but retains a focus on better integration of civilian and military infrastructure, education, manufacturing, and logistics. These personnel goals are less glamorous than the development of space-based military assets or a reorientation of operational strategy but remain nonetheless vital to the PLA's well-being. As several US analysts have observed over the years, the PLA lacks the support of a professional non-commissioned officer corps or recent combat experience. The latter has led to China participating in UN peacekeeping missions, but these human and experiential factors hamper the process of modernisation.

It would be an interesting exercise for those with Mandarin language skills to compare the English and Mandarin versions of China's Defence White Paper. In any case, the white paper does not explain how the laundry list of goals will be achieved or make any assessments of the utility of developing certain capabilities; nor does it get into evaluations of present capabilities as a point of reference. This should be of no surprise as the primary goal of the document is to deter its foreign audience rather than provide an academic study of Chinese military thought processes.

On a concluding note, it is worrisome for countries invested in Pax Americana to see how anti-status quo states like Russia and China are rapidly catching up with the United States in force-on-force warfare, both in terms of material and technology. During this time, the United States has been occupied with learning to fight a different kind of war in the Middle East and Central Asia. It has had little time to dedicate to the strategic shifts in the



western Pacific, and in space and other theatres. India has only a secondary role to play in this imminent clash between powers but how Delhi plays its part in this game over the next 20 years will be very interesting to watch

*No bio information on author.*

<http://www.firstpost.com/world/chinas-defence-white-paper-sees-threats-local-wars-not-major-powers-2281238.html>

[Return to Top](#)

Forbes – New York, NY

OPINION/Article

### **Next Up: Nuclear Talks with North Korea?**

Claudia Rosett, Contributor

June 5, 2015

Beyond the sound and fury of the Iran nuclear talks lies a big follow-up question: What, if anything, does President Obama propose to do during his final stretch in office about the growing nuclear threat of North Korea?

Just this April, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that according to China's estimates, "North Korea may already have 20 warheads, as well as the capability of producing enough weapons-grade uranium to double its arsenal by next year."

As far as Obama has displayed any policy toward North Korea to date, it has consisted chiefly of his administration's amorphous "strategic patience," which some have dubbed "strategic neglect." This has entailed a hodge-podge of toothless scoldings, scattered sanctions and U.S. backing for ineffective United Nations Security Council Resolutions, marking such occasions as North Korea's 2009 and 2013 nuclear tests.

As part of Obama's broader policy of "engagement," his administration has also been offering for years to sit down with North Korea at the nuclear bargaining table, provided North Korea shows some commitment to behave as a credible negotiating partner.

So far, that's gone pretty much nowhere. There was brief excitement over the Feb. 29, 2012 "Leap Day" deal, in which the U.S. offered North Korea aid in exchange for a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests. That came shortly after North Korea's current tyrant King Jong Un inherited power upon the death of his father, Kim Jong Il. Obama administration officials hoped Kim Jong Un might turn out to be more tractable than his forebears. He didn't. The Leap Day deal fell apart two weeks after it was announced, when North Korea went ahead with a long-range missile test.

Mostly, Obama has focused on Iran, while letting North Korea's nuclear ventures take their course. The best that can be said for this approach is that at least Obama has refrained from dignifying Pyongyang with a fresh round of Six-Party nuclear talks (the other five parties in this currently dormant process being China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea). So, let us credit Obama that he has not actively bolstered the Pyongyang regime by lavishing on it the kind of payoffs that North Korea extorted for nuclear deals under President Clinton (the 1994 Agreed Framework) and President Bush (the 2007 Six-Party nuclear deal). In both those deals, North Korea took whatever it could get, cheated, reneged and carried on developing nuclear weapons.

But as the Iran talks grind toward the twice-extended deadline of June 30th, there are signs that Obama may be setting the stage for a more active approach to North Korea. Unfortunately, if he carries through, his most likely course would be to try to double down on the experience of the Iran negotiations by opening nuclear talks with North Korea.



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There are various reasons why Obama might thus bestir himself toward the end of his second term. Perhaps North Korea's expanding nuclear arsenal — with its potential for sales to other rogue states or terrorist groups such as ISIS or Al Qaeda — is becoming too big a worry even for the acolytes of strategic patience. Perhaps the U.S. negotiators at the Iran talks are uncomfortably aware that no matter what constraints they try to impose on Iran's domestic nuclear program, North Korea, a longtime proliferator to the Middle East and ally of Iran, could provide Tehran with a secret nuclear weapons back shop, complete with test facilities. Or perhaps, in the spirit of engaging with rogue regimes, Obama hopes to round out the twilight of his presidency with a trifecta of rapprochements: Iran, Cuba and North Korea.

But what are the signs? Start with the crescendo of public warnings since last October, coming from U.S. military officials, about North Korea's ability to target the U.S. with a nuclear strike.

These warnings are a big change from what Obama himself said just over two years ago, dismissing any such threat. Back in early 2013, worries about North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile prowess were high in the news. North Korea had recently carried out its third nuclear test, following a successful long-range missile test (which Pyongyang called a satellite launch). On top of that, in a congressional hearing on April 11, 2013, Rep. Lamborn (R., Colo.) had tipped out information that the Defense Intelligence Agency assessed with "moderate confidence" that North Korea already had nuclear weapons that could be delivered, though unreliably, on ballistic missiles.

Four days after that bombshell, Obama gave a televised interview to NBC News, Obama was asked if North Korea was capable of building nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. He said no. "Based on our current intelligence, we do not think they have that capacity," he told NBC.

The following year, in Oct. 2014, his administration began to change that public tune. At a Pentagon press conference, in answer to a reporter's question, the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, General Curtis Scaparrotti, said that "personally," he believed North Korea had acquired the capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and mount it on a long-range missile. In other words, North Korea had acquired the expertise — though still apparently untested — to threaten the U.S. with a nuclear strike.

This was alarming news, but it was not an official U.S. government assessment. It came couched as Scaparrotti's personal opinion. Though, given that he kept his job, it seems likely that before he inserted that particular opinion into a Pentagon press conference, he got a green light from on high.

Then, this April, at another Pentagon press conference, came confirmation from the head of the U.S. Northern Command, Admiral William Gortney, that U.S. officialdom believes North Korea has the ability to make nuclear missiles, though apparently still untested. Gortney did not deliver this information as a personal opinion, but as an official appraisal. Referring to the road-mobile KN-08 ballistic missiles paraded by North Korea in 2012, Gortney said: "Yes. Our assessment is that they have the ability to put it on — a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the homeland."

It's not clear what really changed between Obama's denial in 2013, Scaparrotti's personal opinion in 2014 and Gortney's official confirmation in 2015. Perhaps North Korea made a big advance, and U.S. officials only recently found out. Perhaps the Obama administration decided it was finally time to share with the public some of the alarming information it already had.

Whatever the back story, the obvious implication — put out there by the administration itself — is that strategic patience is not containing North Korea's runaway nuclear program. Presumably, Obama must protect a worried public by doing something more.

Which brings us to the administration's copious stream of invitations to North Korea to come back to the nuclear bargaining table. It's part of Obama's policy that the door to engagement is always open. Kerry has been reminding North Korea of that for years, but lately he seems especially keen on the project. Last October, when North Korea



released an American citizen it had effectively been holding hostage in prison, Kerry said, "we hope that the dynamics can develop in the next few weeks, months perhaps, where we could get back to talks." Last month, while visiting Beijing, Kerry said he hopes an Iran nuclear deal could have a "positive influence" on North Korea.

Also last month, the Associated Press reported that "after three years of diplomatic deadlock, the Obama administration says it is open to holding preliminary talks with North Korea to probe its intentions and assess the prospects of ridding the country of nuclear weapons." Quoting an anonymous senior U.S. official, the AP reported that the U.S. is willing to be flexible on format if that's what it takes for "serious dialogue." Last week, the U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Sung Kim, was conferring in Seoul with his counterparts from South Korea and Japan, telling *The New York Times*, "We agreed on the importance of enhancing pressure and sanctions on North Korea even as we keep all diplomatic options on the table."

Actually, while the options may be open, U.S. sanctions policy toward North Korea has appeared distinctly conciliatory lately, if only by omission. Last December, Obama blamed North Korea for a massive cyber attack on Sony Pictures and its Hollywood movie "The Interview." On Jan. 2, 2015, Obama signed an executive order outlining sweeping authority to impose U.S. sanctions on any found to be a government official of North Korea, a member of its ruling Workers' Party, or any entity or individual controlled by either. That same day, the U.S. added 10 mid-level North Korean officials to its sanctions blacklist. And there it stopped. In the five months since, no one and nothing else has been added.

The real solution — almost certainly the only solution — to the growing nuclear threat of North Korea does not lie in bringing Pyongyang's envoys back to the nuclear bargaining table, but in bringing down the Pyongyang regime. That would require shunning and undermining Kim, not extending a hand. Clinton and Bush both tried diplomacy, and failed. The odds for Obama are far worse. On his own watch, North Korea has amassed more nuclear wares to bargain with, carried out a second and third nuclear test, and prepared to detonate a fourth. Totalitarian North Korea aspires not to barter away its arsenal, but to be recognized as a nuclear state. In that calculus, the more weapons and threats Pyongyang can bring — periodically — to the table, the better the haul of concessions it can extort. Don't be surprised if sometime in coming months, North Korea celebrates Kerry's next invitation to talk by setting off its next nuclear test.

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<http://www.forbes.com/sites/claudiarosett/2015/06/05/next-up-nuclear-talks-with-north-korea/>

[Return to Top](#)

## **ABOUT THE USAF CUWS**

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation .

The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the



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Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence.

In February 2014, the Center's name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term "unconventional weapons," currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.

The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.

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